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ABSTRACT: 
Political conflicts in the Western fringe of the Saharan desert since the second half 
of the 1950s have involved actors using competing territorial imaginaries, which 
disagree on the question of sovereignty and who should hold it. As soon as newly 
independent Morocco claimed the then Spanish Sahara as part of a "Greater 
Morocco", other nationalist projects such as the "Ensamble Mauritanien", the 
"Spanish nation" and the "Saharawi people", incorporated the colony into their 
own imagined territories in incompatible ways. All of these geographical visions 
were justified by different interpretations of the history of the Atlantic Sahara. This 
article shows the role played by alternative conceptions of this space, and the 
histories that supported them, during the end of Spanish colonial rule and the 
beginning of Moroccan control. It also shows how new ideas of state sovereignty 
and political legitimacy within the regional and international context conditioned 
the competing territorial conceptions and discouraged any attempt to develop a 
non-nationalist imagination. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The ongoing conflict between the Moroccan government and the POLISARIO 
Front over the Atlantic fringe of the Sahara Desert has its roots in the end of 
Spanish colonial rule in the area, which had lasted from 1884 until the mid 1970s. 
During the armed conflict that broke out in 1975, Morocco built two thousand 
kilometres of sand walls that crossed the territory from northeast to southwest, 
separating the most “useful” regions in the west from those controlled by the 
POLISARIO from its base in the refugee camps in Algeria. Since the armistice of 
1991, supervised by the United Nations (UN), the position of the actors has hardly 
changed, and people on both sides continue to suffer severe restrictions on their 
citizenship rights. 
Many studies have analysed the origin of the conflict from different, and even 
rival, perspectives. Some of them define the initial situation as a "failed" or 
"unfinished" decolonization process, as the former Spanish colony did not become 
a sovereign state as most European colonies in Africa did.1 Others consider the 
integration of Western Sahara into the Kingdom of Moroccan as a partial 
reconstruction of an old African polity dismembered by the European partition.2 
Without denying the merits of either perspective, our contribution will regard the 
situation as the result of competing nationalist projects, which appeared towards 
the end of the 1950s. 
As Fred Cooper has shown for other European colonies in Africa, there never was 
rarely only one single anticolonial movement that led inevitably to the 
independence of each African state.3 Social mobilizations were plural and diverse 
in their composition, aims and leadership. They sometimes converged around a 
nationalist discourse and a single political party, but many other times they 
competed. In addition, they were all developed in a changing political context, in 
which colonial powers were reforming their rule in a more intrusive and inclusive 
ways, intervening more intensely in the lives of their African subjects. 
Most anticolonial demands finally concurred on one main aspiration: that peculiar 
organization, the nation-state, “based on the idea of a single people in a single 
territory constituting itself as a unique political community”,4 which recognizes no 
                                                
1 J.I. Algueró Cuervo, El Sáhara y España: Claves de una Descolonización Pendiente, Santa Cruz de 
Tenerife, 2006; S. Zunes and J. Mundy, Western Sahara: War, Nationalism, and Conflict Irresolution, 
Syracuse, NY, 2010. P. San Martín, Western Sahara: the Refugee Nation, Cardiff, 2010; C. Ruiz 
Miguel, El Sahara Occidental y España, historia, política y derecho: análisis crítico de la política exterior 
española, Madrid, 1995. 
2 M. Cherkaoui, Morocco and the Sahara: Social Bonds and Geopolitical Issues, Oxford, 2010; A. 
Boukhars and J. Roussellier, Perspectives on Western Sahara: Myths, Nationalisms, and Geopolitics, 
Lanham MD, 2014; B. López García, "Limitaciones de la política marroquí en relación con el 
Sahara Occidental", Transmodernity Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of the Luso-Hispanic 
World, 5(3) (2015) 149-165. 
3 F. Cooper, Africa since 1940. The Past of the Present, Cambridge, 2002. 
4 J. Burbank and F. Cooper, Empires in World History, Princeton and Oxford, 2010, 8. 
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authority above its own.5 But the post-colonial nation had to be imagined before 
being fought for.6 And the national territory and its borders, far from being a 
given, also had to be defined by those who imagined their nations.7  
The specific aspect upon which our study focuses is the capacity of borders to 
demarcate imaginary territories that support national political projects.8 David 
Knight has already called attention to the need to consider the geographical 
perspective in shaping national identities.9 Maps have the power to realize the 
spatial imagination of national projects and help us to understand how these 
projects relate to and confront the same territory. Thus Thongchai Winichakul’s on 
Siam (Thailand), has highlighted the importance of maps as symbolic 
representations of spatial realities in legitimizing power, domination and 
subordination, and their contribution to the nationalist imagination as a powerful 
icon.10 Acknowledging Winichakul's work, Benedict Anderson, the pioneer 
theorist of the social construction of nations, has highlighted the role of maps and 
geographical imaginations.11 His focus, like ours, is not on the physical boundaries, 
but on those imagined lines that, with more or less correspondence to –or 
divergence from– the spatial practice of power, are even capable of mobilizing 
people to the point of killing or dying for their nations. 
Due to the imaginative character and the totalizing aspiration of the nation-state, 
there is always the possibility of alternative and incompatible nationalist claims, 
based on different conceptualizations of the people and the territory. As Mark 
Prucell notes in his study of Arabic and Coptic communities in Egypt, when two or 
more communities envision their national territories in the same place, an 
"inevitable" struggle for the same occurs.12 This is what happened in late-colonial 
Spanish Sahara, as a strong disagreement regarding the nation that should 
compose the new postcolonial state emerged, and imagined borders became a 
fundamental element under discussion.  
In order to analyse precisely the role of geographical imaginations in the political 
struggles around this territory during the years when Spanish colonialism drew to 
                                                
5 J. Bartelson, Sovereignty as a Symbolic Form, Oxon and New York, 2014, 41. 
6 B. Anderson, Imagined Communities Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, London, 
1991. 
7 J. Anderson, "Nationalist ideology and territory", in: R. Johnston, D. Knight and E. Kofman (Eds), 
Nationalism, self-determination, and political geography, New York, 1988, 18.  
8 Different dimensions of African borders have been explored by members of the African 
Borderlands Research Network (www.aborne.org last accessed 19 July 2016) or the FrontAfrique 
project (www.frontafrique.org  last accessed 23 July 2016). 
9 D. Knight, "Identity and territory: geographical perspectives on nationalism and regionalism", 
Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 72 (1982) 514–531. 
10 T. Winichakul, Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation, University of Hawaii Press, 
1994. 
11 Anderson, Imagined Communities, chapter 10. 
12 M. Purcell, "A place for the copts: imagined territory y and spatial conflict in Egypt", Ecumene, 5 
(4) (1998) 432-450, 443 
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a close we will discuss alternative maps that were elaborated or used to 
corroborate different political claims. These maps will help us to understand the 
position and aims of the political actors in the successive conflicts over the Sahara, 
and how they have made use of divergent interpretations of the territory and its 
history, in order to provide a basis for their aspirations.  
We begin our account in 1956, when the government of the recently independent 
state of Morocco claimed the then Spanish Western Africa, as part of Greater 
Morocco, inheritor of the old Sherifian Empire. Countering this, the Mauritanian 
independence movement to the south considered that the territory had belonged to 
an "Ensamble Mauritanien", which should be decolonized as a whole. Meanwhile, 
the colonial power reacted by declaring its African colonies to be an integral part of  
theSpanish state, transforming therefore their own national imagination. (section 
III). Only at the end of the 1960s did the idea of a Saharawi nation, corresponding 
to the land of the then Spanish Sahara, emerge as part of a local nationalist 
movement (section IV).  
Having set out these contending visions we argue that the UN became a main 
arena where these rival imaginaries clashed. The Afro-Asiatic group of countries, 
which dominated the politics of decolonization at the UN, helped contributed to 
configure the terms of these struggles. In the end, the UN contributed to the 
general use of nationalism as the main language in which anticolonial demands 
were expressed. However, proposals that did not take a nationalist approach and 
which considered the possibility of sharing and redistributing power over Spanish 
Sahara, also existed (section VI). In the last section we will briefly refer to the 
persistence of opposing geographical imaginations since the mid-1970s in the 
conflict between the government in Rabat and the POLISARIO movement. 
As will be evident, our focus will in on elite geopolitical imaginations rather than 
how other social groups relate to, or conceptualize, this territory. There is much to 
be said in this respect, especially on the role of nomadic vis a vis sedentary forms of 
life for the geographical imagination, or the impact of migration and exile on the 
formation of political imaginations.13 What is clear is that the competing nationalist 
projects we will discuss in detail below diverged more or less dramatically from 
the political understanding of space that had dominated the desert prior to the 
urbanization processes which started in the 1950s. 
Before then the political order was articulated as autonomous tribes or kabilas. 
These were organized along lineage lines, but did not exclude relationships with 
more centralized polities occupying the fringes of the desert.14 Different 
sovereignties overlapped in the same spaces, while the territory did not determine 
either the status or the rights and privileges of persons. Maps drawn by 
geographers and anthropologists during colonial times usually defined no clear 
                                                
13 On these questions see the work of A. Wilson, "Ambiguities of Space and Control: When Refugee 
Camp and Nomadic Encampment Meet", Nomadic Peoples 18(1) (2014) 38-60. 
14 A. López Bargados, Arenas Coloniales. Los Awlad Dalim ante la Colonización Franco-Española del 
Sáhara, Barcelona, 2003. 
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borders for the "nomads" of the western fringe of the Saharan desert. One of those 
maps is included in the most thorough ethnography of the Spanish Sahara, 
Estudios Saharianos, written in 1955 by the anthropologist Julio Caro Baroja. Fig. 1 
shows how the movement of the local population and their conception of the space 
clearly trascended well-defined colonial frontiers, but without generating 
alternative ones.15  
 
 
Fig. 1: Orientation sectors and familiar regions for the nomads of Spanish Sahara 
From J. Caro Baroja, Estudios Saharianos, Madrid, 1955, 66. 
 
Paradoxically, the special fluidity of relations of people and space in the desert 
may have helped to support alternative and contradictory claims on the territory 
and the population that lived within it.  
 
                                                
15 J. Caro Baroja, Estudios Saharianos, Madrid, 1955. 
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GREATER MOROCCO IN THE ATLANTIC SAHARA 
Soon after the independence of the French Protectorate and the Spanish Northern 
Protectorate in Morocco in 1956, the Moroccan nationalist and anticolonial party 
Istiqlal articulated the vision of Greater Morocco. On the 5th of July that year the 
party's journal, Al Alam, published a map which depicted a polity running from 
the Mediterranean to the Senegal River and from the Atlantic to Timbuctu (Fig.2). 
The map was authored by Abdelkebir Al-Fassi, brother of Istiqlal founder Allal Al-
Fassi. According to the latter's commentary on the map (based on his discourse in 
Tangier on 18 June) "for reasons of geography, history, and international law the 
"natural frontiers" of Moroccan Sahara should end where Mauritania meets 
Senegal". This territory would include parts of French Algeria and French West 
Africa, as well as what still remained of the Spanish Southern Protectorate in 
Morocco and the Spanish Sahara. It would cover nearly two million square 
kilometres.16 
 
 
 
Fig. 2: Greater Morocco 
Copy of the map published by Al Fassi in Moroccan journal Al-Alam,  
included in a Spanish translation of the issue dedicated to the Sahara.  
The territory of Spanish Sahara has been shaded in by the Spanish translator. 
 
                                                
16 F. Villar, El proceso de autodeterminación del Sáhara, Valencia, 1982, 45. Letter by the Director 
General de Plazas y Provincias Españolas to the Director General de Relaciones con Marruecos, 29 
May 1975, translating into Spanish the Al Alam issue of 5 July 1956. We thank Bernabé López for 
this information 
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The history to which Al-Fassi refers was that of the Sherifian Empire or Sultanate, 
whose territories were divided by European colonialism in the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries.17 According to this nationalist interpretation of the sultanate's 
past, "the Western Sahara played a decisive role in the history of the creation of 
Morocco in the 11th century”, and it had constituted a “privileged land” of the 
Moroccan anticolonial resistance.18 The end of French and Spanish colonial rule in 
the region would mean, according to this argument, the restoration of the old 
sultanate (now a kingdom) and the redrawing of boundaries.  
After initial disputes between the monarchy and the Moroccan national 
movement, this doctrine became official when King Mohamed V adopted it in 
1958.19 From the Moroccan point of view, the idea of a Greater Morocco justified 
two initial wars and the support of armed groups in neighbouring areas. In 
October 1957, what remained of the anticolonial National Liberation Army (ALN) 
launched irregular attacks in Ifni, the southern part of the protectorate under 
Spanish rule, and in Spanish Sahara, as well as in Mauritania, which were under 
French control. At this time, many young men from the Saharan kabilas 
participated in the Moroccan ALN. The so-called Ifni-Sahara war resulted in the 
integration of the southern part of the protectorate in Morocco, whereas a French-
Spanish operation crushed the armed rebellion in the Spanish Sahara and 
Mauritania.20 
The subsequent decolonization of neighbouring countries fed Moroccan anxieties. 
After Mauritania achieved its independence in 1960, the Moroccan government 
supported some rebel groups in the north who sought integration into Morocco. 
The end of the bloody anticolonial war in French Algeria in 1962 gave birth to a 
new sovereign state, whose enormous territory comprised both a Mediterranean 
fringe and a large portion of the Sahara Desert, and frustrated in great part  
Moroccan irredentist aspirations. Rabat’s government failed in its diplomatic effort 
to convince Houari Boumédiène and the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) to 
give back those areas that, according to the idea of a Greater Morocco, France had 
removed from the Sherifian Empire.21 In 1963 Morocco occupied the frontier region 
between both countries. This "Sand War" ended within a few months with the 
establishment of a demilitarized zone, and provided the basis for the long lasting 
hostility between the governments. 
                                                
17 W. Zartman, "The politics of boundaries in North and West Africa", Journal of Modern African 
Studies, 3(2) (1965) 155-173. 
18 These arguments were articulated two decades later in front of the International Court of Justice, 
during the process of the Advisory Opinion of Western Sahara that we will mention later. ICJ, 
Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents. Western Sahara. Volume III, 1975, 170 and 185.  
19 M. Hernando de Larramendi, "Ideología y política en el Marruecos postcolonial: irredentismo y 
cultura política en el Marruecos en los primeros años de la independencia", in: A. Torremocha 
Silva (Ed.), La Conferencia Internacional de Algeciras de 1906. Cien Años Después, Cádiz, 2008, 307-320. 
20 G. Montoro, "La retrocesión de Tarfaya e Ifni", Espacio, Tiempo y Forma. Serie V, Historia 
Contemporánea, 4 (1991) 181-190; C. Canales and M. del Río, Breve Historia de la Guerra Ifni-Sáhara, 
Madrid, 2010. 
21 Zartman, The politics of boundaries, 164. 
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During the rest of 1960s, Moroccan territorial ambitions were reduced to making 
claims over the Spanish colony, especially after the formal recognition of 
Mauritanian independence in 1969. Moreover, international organizations became 
the main forum for Moroccan claims, and these had to take into account the new 
language developed around the self-determination of people that was used to 
pursue the end of European colonial rule in Asia and Africa. The UN General 
Assembly resolution 1514(XV) of 1960 had definitely outlawed colonialism and 
considered the sovereign state to be the normal destiny of former colonies. Other 
UN resolutions, as well as the first ones approved by the Organization for the 
African Union (OUA) founded in 1963, established respect for the old colonial 
borders in the configuration of new independent states, adopting in this way the 
old legal principle of uti possidetis.22 A new UN body, known as the Committee of 
Twenty Four, was created in order to promote and monitor the application of the 
new rules by the colonial powers and to offer a forum for the demands of 
anticolonial movements. 
Moroccan independence was obviously part of the decolonization movement. Yet, 
from the beginning, Rabat's irredentist claims over surrounding areas constituted a 
dissident voice within the OAU and the UN and its Committee on Decolonization, 
where colonial powers were scrutinized and had to meet with anticolonial groups. 
Arguments based on pre-colonial history, and on the dismembering effects of 
colonial partition on older polities (such as the Sherifian Sultanate), had not much 
echo among Afro-Asian representatives, except for some members of the Arab 
League countries. Not by accident, many of the territorial contours of the new 
postcolonial states that were joining the UN were colonial in origin. However, in 
part as a result of heterodox positions such as Morocco's resolution 1541(XV), two 
other possibilities were considered in order to put an end to colonial rule: either 
free association with, or integration in, an independent state.23 These alternative 
solutions would, however, be conditioned by the decision of the population in a 
referendum.  
The voice of Moroccan diplomats would always be heard during the discussions 
on the General Assembly resolutions concerning Spanish Sahara since 1966. From 
the very first, each one reflected Moroccan interests, asking the Spanish 
“administering Power” to consult “with the governments of Mauritania and 
Morocco and any other interested party, the procedures for the holding of a 
referendum under United Nations auspices with a view to enabling the indigenous 
population of the Territory to exercise freely its right to self determination”.24 It 
was precisely Morocco’s insistence that made the referendum a constant 
requirement in the UN policy towards Spanish Sahara.  
  
                                                
22 For an analysis of the legal dimension of decolonization see A. Cassese, The Self-Determination of 
Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal, Cambridge, 1995. 
23 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 1541(XV), 1960. 
24 UNGA Resolution 2229(XXI), 1966. 
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LA GRANDE MAURITANIE ÉCONOMIQUE ET SPIRITUELLE 
As can be seen in the UN resolution of 1966, Moroccan interest in Spanish Sahara 
was not unique. An alternative claim came precisely from a territory that had also 
been gathered into Greater Morocco by Al-Fassi. In a discourse in 1957, three years 
before Mauritanian independence, the man who was to become the country's "rst 
president, Moktar Ould Daddah, had celebrated “the innumerable links that bind 
us” to the people of Spanish Sahara. He the appealed “to our brothers in Spanish 
Sahara to dream of this great economic and spiritual Mauritania” and addressed to 
them "a message of friendship, a call to the concord of all the Moors from the 
Atlantic to Azawad and from the Draa (river) to the shores of Senegal”.25 In doing 
so he was defining an area that included, along with Mauritania, the Spanish 
possessions in the Atlantic Sahara, and the northern parts of French Mali (Azawad) 
and French Senegal. 
Mauritanian authorities such as Daddah claimed Spanish Sahara as part of their 
own territory on the basis of an alternative history to that of Greater Morocco: the 
Ensamble Mauritanien, Bilad Chinguetti or the Moors people.26 These terms 
defined a political and cultural area which occupied the Atlantic Sahara and Sahel, 
and was formed of two kinds of political entities which were strongly linked to 
each other: the nomadic and pastoralist tribes that used to cross the desert, and the 
more centralized and sedentary emirates of Trazna, Brakna, Tagant and Adrar. The 
population of the Spanish Sahara was understood to belong to one or other of the 
five kabilas –Aroussiyin, Oulad Dleim, Oulad Bou Sba, Ahel Barikalla, Rgueibat– 
that also inhabited the Mauritanian desert. The fact that these people frequently 
crossed the colonial borders in their everyday activities was taken as proof of the 
existence of a united Mauritania, of which the former Spanish colony was part.  
There was no official map of this Greater Mauritania comparable to that produced 
by Al Fassi. Fig. 3 represents what is locally known as Trab El-Bidan (the "Land of 
the Whites" in Hassaniya Arabic), and can be found in some academic works on 
the Atlantic Sahara. This area coincides approximately with the imaginary social 
space to which Ould Daddah and the Mauritanian diplomats referred to in order 
to legitimate their claims.27 These maps were produced, however, after the 
Mauritanans dropped their irredentist demands, and they only aim to support 
academic arguments about the cultural similarities of the people living in this area.  
                                                
25 M. Ould Daddah, La Mauritanie Contre Vents et Marées, Paris, 2003, 5-6. (Authors' translation). 
26 These were the concepts used by the Mauritanian delegation in the written statement presented 
before the ICJ, see ICJ, Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents. Western Sahara. Volume III, 1975, 58-
90.  
27 S. Caratini, Les Rgaybat. 1610-1934, Vol. 1, Paris, 1989, 21; F. Pinto Cebrián, Proverbios Saharauis, 
Madrid, 1997; López Bargados, Arenas Coloniales, 41. 
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Fig. 3: Trab El-Bidan 
From F. Pinto Cebrián, Proverbios Saharauis, Madrid, 1997 (V).  
 
Due to Mauritania’s weakness as a state, these claims were initially expressed in a 
more nuanced and prudent way than those of the Moroccan government, and their 
authors never intended to aspire to territories other than Spanish Sahara. The fact 
that Trab El-Bidan extended to lands of Algeria and Mali may be one of the reasons 
why there was never an official map of this imaginary. Moreover, in the discourse 
of Ould Daddah's initial appeal to an “economic and spiritual” brotherhood had 
avoided direct mention of political union, although this would be expressed more 
clearly over time.  
As a result, the Mauritanian delegation at the Committee on Decolonization 
periodically demanded, from the first General Assembly resolution on Western 
Sahara in 1966, the inclusion in the referendum that should be organized by the 
Spanish in the colony of the option of the integration into Mauritania. When, in 
1969, the Moroccan authorities finally recognized Mauritania as a sovereign state, 
what had previously been Moroccan arguments for the assimilation of the Spanish 
Sahara to the Mauritanian lands could now be used by the Mauritanian 
irredentists themselves. 
 
ÁFRICA OCCIDENTAL ESPAÑOLA AND THE SPANISH NATION 
A variety of official and semi-official maps that reflected changing political and 
territorial conceptualizations of the Spanish Sahara also appeared in Spain. By the 
time of Moroccan independence in 1956, the Spanish territories running south to 
the French possessions had been governed as Spanish Western Africa since 1946. 
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That included, under one same governor, the southern part of the protectorate in 
Morocco, the two territories of Seguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro, and the Ifni 
enclave. These are shown as part of a single political entity on the map in Fig. 4 
which was commissioned in the early 1950s by the official Institute of African 
Studies in Madrid, under the auspices of the Dirección General de Marruecos y 
Colonias at the Spanish Ministry of the Presidency. 28   
 
 
Fig 4: Spanish Western Africa 
From Dirección General de Marruecos y Colonias, IDEA, 1951-1952. 
 
In 1958 the Treaty of Angra de Cintra between Rabat and Madrid put an end to the 
Ifni-Sahara war, and delivered to Morocco the southern part of the old 
protectorate. This implied moving the southern border of Morocco to 27º 40" 
parallel.29 At the same time, the colony of Spanish Saharawas established 
comprising both the Seguia el Hamra and Rio de Oro areas. The map in Fig. 5 was 
published in 1960 by one of the main theorists of Spanish colonialism during the 
Francoist regime, José María Cordero Torres, in a work on the history of Spanish 
                                                
28 This map was a reduction of the geometric one elaborated by the Geographical Service of the 
Spanish Army Spanish, finished in 1949 at 1:500.000 scale, which was part of the Spanish 
compromise with the International Map of the World project. On the production of that map, see 
J.A.  Rodríguez Esteban, "El mapa del África Occidental Española de 1949 a escala 1:500.000: 
orgullo militar, camelladas y juegos poéticos saharauis", Cybergeo: European Journal of Geography, 
2011. 
29 This was the line established in the Treaty of 1912, under which France recognized a new area of 
expansion to Spain southwards into its Moroccan possessions. 
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borders. It indicates along each border the years in which they were defined by 
colonial partition and the independence of Morocco.  
 
Fig. 5: Map of Spanish Sahara after 1958 
From J.M. Cordero Torres, Fronteras Hispánicas geografía e historia diplomática y administración, 
Madrid, 1960, 425. 
 
At the end of the 1950s, Spanish authorities were also elaborating a new argument 
in order to legitimize their rule over their African colonies. This included an 
alternative territorial representation of the western edge of the Sahara Desert. By 
that time, it seemed clear for many in Africa and Europe alike, that the colonial 
rule was coming to an end. In 1958, the French government tried to change its 
already transformed empire (the French Union) into a kind of confederation under 
the leadership of France (the French Community), though only two years later it 
recognized the independence of most of its African colonies. Great Britain had 
attempted different versions of self-government for its African colonies since the 
end of the Second World War. However, it also started to withdraw, in the late 
1950s, beginning with the Gold Coast-Ghana in 1957. 
Spain, as discussed above, had been forced to retire from the Moroccan 
Protectorate in 1956 and 1958. Within the United Nations, which Spain had joined 
in 1955, it was confronted by the anticolonial movement led by the Afro-Asiatic 
group in the United Nations, to which Spain had been admitted in 1955. In this 
context, the determination of Franco’s regime to retain the colonies of Spanish 
Guinea, Spanish Sahara and the enclave of Sidi-Ifni required changes in the form 
and legitimation of their colonial rule. As in the case of the Moroccan and 
13 
Mauritanian claims, this new form used the language of nationalism. On this 
occasion it the Spanish nation that was redrawn. So, in January 1958, a decree 
formally declared that Spanish Sahara and Ifni were to become new provinces of 
the Spanish national territory. The following year, Spanish Guinea became the 
Spanish provinces of Fernando Po and Río Muni.30 This was an obvious imitation 
of the Portuguese strategy in their African colonies, through which both countries 
tried to avoid the accusation of being colonialist in the international forums. The 
legislative process of provincialización, as it was called, meant a formal 
reimagination of the Spanish nation, which was now composed of territories in 
Europe and in Africa.  
Fig. 6 represents this new administrative situation depicting the Spanish state as 
comprised as much of African as of European territories. It appeared in a 1967 
book on Spanish Africa authored by General José Díaz de Villegas, the highest 
authority on the Spanish colonies at the Ministry of the Presidency. Díaz de 
Villegas was also the director of the Institute of African Studies (IDEA), which 
tried to monopolize the official study of Spanish African territories, and published 
numerous books such as this one. 
 
 
Fig. 6: "Spanish	  provinces in Africa’	  
From J. Díaz de Villegas, África Española en la Geopolítica y  
Geoestrategia Nacionales,  Madrid, 1967, 425. 
                                                
30 For Spanish Sahara: Decreto por el que se reorganiza el Gobierno General del África occidental 
Española, 10 Jan. 1958; and for Equatorial Guinea, Ley sobre organización y régimen jurídico de 
las provincias africanas, 191/1959. 
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This new status brought some changes to the political order in Spanish Sahara. In 
the ensuing years, the Spanish colonies were included in the national Economic 
and Social Development Plans. Within this scheme, social services increased and 
numerous public works were promoted, such as seaports, institutional buildings, 
water wells, tracks and lighthouses.31 Yet this did not mean equality between 
Spanish Sahara and the other provinces, or within the colony itself, as social and 
legal differentiation between the "Native" and "European" populations continued 
to characterise the political order.32 In fact, it is during this period that we can talk 
of a second colonial occupation of the territory, which subordinated the country in a 
more intensive way to Spanish control.33 The military presence, and the 
participation of many more local soldiers in the colonial army, had increased after 
the French-Spanish war against the Moroccan National Liberation Army in 1957-
1958. The discovery of the Bucráa phosphate mines in 1963 brought new extractive 
interests from Madrid, after decades during which the main colonial exploitation 
activities had focused on the coastal fisheries.  
It was within this new structure that the chiuj, or heads of Saharan local kabilas, 
were integrated into the colonial administration, and their functions regulated with 
great precision as key intermediaries between the Spanish administration and the 
local population, establishing a true indirect rule. The population of the territory 
was classified as either "Spanish" or "Natives" in a clearer way than before, and 
despite the integration process. A new decree in 1962 (3249/1962) introduced a 
colonial council (Cabildo Provincial), in which key local intermediaries were 
represented along with Spanish representatives from the municipalities and the 
economic and cultural associations.34  
In May 1967 a Saharan General Assembly or Yemáa was added to this system.35 It 
was intended to enhance the representative character of the colonial institutions: 
the chiujs members would be elected from among the household heads of tribes 
and fractions, and there would be forty other representatives elected from among 
the male members of the population older than twenty-one. Elections were 
organized for the first time, and 9056 men were eligible to vote for the 
representatives to the Yemáa and the Francoist national assembly (Cortes Españolas) 
in Madrid. This reform was trying to respond to the social changes and pressures 
that, as we will see, were occurring in the territory and beyond. But within the 
authoritarian Spanish regime, the Yemáa had only consultative functions.  
                                                
31 C. Barona, Los hijos de la nube. Estructura y vicisitudes del Sáhara Español desde 1958 hasta la debacle, 
Madrid, 2004; A. García, Historias del Sáhara: lo mejor y lo peor de los mundos, Madrid, 2002; T. 
Hodges, Western Sahara and the roots of a desert war, Westport, CT, 1983. 
32 J.A Rodríguez Esteban and D.A. Barrado Timón, "Le processus d’urbanisation dans le Sahara 
espagnol (1884-1975): une composante essentielle du projet colonial", Cahiers de l'Emam, 24-25 
(2015) Monograph: Sahara Occidental: Memoires, Culture, Histoires. 
33 A. Campos-Serrano and V. Trassosmontes, "Ressources naturelles et seconde occupation coloniale 
du Sahara Espagnol: 1959-1975", Cahiers de l'Emam, 24-25 (2015) Monograph: Sahara Occidental: 
Memoires, Culture, Histoires.  
34 Campos-Serrano and Trassosmontes, Ressources naturelles. 
35 Hodges, Western Sahara. 
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In summary, the second Spanish colonial occupation was so late that it was almost 
contemporary with the "winds of change" and the spread of nationalist demands in 
most of Africa at the end of the 1950s. That meant that, when Spain was 
establishing a form of indirect rule, it had to legitimate its claim over the territory 
in languages closer to those of nationalism than of the old European civilizing 
mission. 
 
IMAGINING THE SAHARAWI NATION 
As has been shown, from late 1950s the Spanish Sahara was being imagined as part 
of different competing nations: Morocco, Mauritania and even Spain. People living 
in the territory participated, in different ways, in these projects. However, by the 
end of the 1960s an alternative nation was being constructed: the "Saharawi 
people", which was comprised of the "natives" living within the existing colonial 
borders. In spite of the colonial origin of many of the elements of this new 
imaginary, this project would become widely embraced by the local population by 
the 19702.  
The idea of a Saharawi nation emerged in a context of rapid social change in the 
territory. Since the 1958-1959 war, the settlement of the nomadic population in the 
cities increased exponentially.36 By the mid 19602, the phosphates mines in Bucráa 
not only attracted many Spaniards, but also generated new work possibilities for 
the young Saharans, contributing to the proletarianization of the former 
pastoralists.37 According to the census conducted by the Spanish administration in 
1974, after the terrible drought of 1968-1973 only 18% of the population lived 
outside urban centres.  
These new social spaces, cities and mines, were configured as segmented places, in 
which locals and non-locals occupied different niches and enjoyed different labour 
and life conditions. Spanish settlers, from the Canary Islands and the peninsula, 
lived in the oldest neighbourhoods; whereas most of the autochthones were 
crammed into peripheral slums made of tents and temporary materials in the 
peripheries, without sanitation and other services. Saharans working for the 
colonial administration or mining sites tended to occupy the lower levels,38 and 
their salaries were lower than those earned by Europeans.39  
Living under these conditions younger people became more and more aware of 
social segregation, discrimination in the education system, and salary disparities 
                                                
36 Villar, El proceso de autodeterminación, 29; Rodríguez Esteban and Barrado Timón, Le processus 
d’urbanisation. 
37 García, Historias del Sáhara, 30. 
38 T. Bárbulo, La historia prohibida del Sáhara Español, Las Palmas de Gran Canarias, 2002; García, 
Historias del Sáhara. 
39 UN Visiting Mission to Spanish Sahara, 1975, General Assembly, 30th Session, Supplement 23, 
UN DocumentA/10023/Rev. paragraphs 155-167. Bárbulo, La Historia prohibida. 
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with the Spaniards, as well as their exclusion from the colonial order. Tensions 
between urban youthe and the chiujs" generation increased, as the narrowness and 
conservative character of the new provincial institutions became more and more 
evident.40 At the end of the 1960s expressions of social discontent appeared, 
inevitably conditioned by the despotic character of the Francoist colonial regime.41  
It was in this new social context, of sedentarisation and intergenerational conflict, 
that the idea of a Saharawi nation was first articulated. The Organización Avanzada 
para la Liberación del Sahara (Advanced Organization for the Sahara Liberation - 
OALS) was founded by Mohamad Sidi Ibrahim Basir (nicknamed Basiri), an 
activist from Tam-Tam, in southern Morocco. The OALS started claiming greater 
autonomy for of the territory, albeit as a state associated to Spain, as a previous 
step towards a negotiated independence.42 This was the first time that the idea of a 
Saharawi nation, different from Spain, Morocco or Mauritania, was expressed. Its 
appearance was associated to some extent with social revolution, as there was an 
implied criticism of the inequality of rights between Europeans and natives, and of 
the undemocratic character of the chiuj structure and the colonial Yemáa.  
However, while Equatorial Guinea obtained independence in 1968, after the 
celebration of a Constitutional Conference, and Ifni was integrated into Morocco 
the following year, Spanish politicians took a tougher position towards Spanish 
Sahara. This is explained by the growing mining interests, the personal attachment 
of the Spanish dictator to the Sahara, and the competing demands of Morocco and 
Mauritania. Its effects on the ground were evident during the repression of the 
great demonstration organized by the OALS on 17th June 1970 in El Aaiún, during 
an “act of support for Spain” which has been organized by the colonial governor. 
The petition that was handed over during the protest asked for immediate 
independence.43 In response, Basiri was detained, tortured and disappeared.44  
Together with increased repressive measures, the government tried to enhanced 
the representative character of colonial institutions. A reserved decree dated 4th 
October 1970 reinforced local sectors different from the chiuj at the Yemáa, and in 
1971 new young representatives were incorporated into the Yemáa, the council 
and the municipalities. On 30th April 1973, an ordenanza reformed the functions of 
the chiuj and local Yemáas to make their role more democratic.45 In spite of all these 
measures, endence movement was taking a new form with the creation in May 
1973 of the Frente Popular de Liberación de Seguia el Hamra y Río de Oro 
                                                
40 UN Visiting Mission, paragraph 123. 
41 E. Bengochea Tirado, "La movilización nacionalista saharaui y la mujeres durante el último 
periodo colonial español", Revista Historia Autónoma, 3 (2013) 113-128, 117. 
42 A-B. Miské, Front Polisario, l’Âme d’un People, Paris, 1979. 
43 The UNGA resolution 2711 (XXV), regretted “the incidents of bloodshed which occurred in the 
Territory in June 1970" and demanded the Spanish Government "take effective measures to create 
the atmosphere of dètente required for the orderly holding of the referendum as defined by the 
relevant resolutions of the General Assembly”. 
44 García, Historias del Sáhara; Barona, Hijos de la nube. 
45 Campos-Serrano & Trassosmontes, Ressources naturelles. 
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POLISARIO by Saharans in the exile in Zuerat (Mauritania). This organization, 
especially popular among women and the young, demanded the recognition of a 
sovereign state differentiated from any other state in the region, adopted a socialist 
program, and was initially opposed to the celebration of the referendum being 
proposed by United Nations.46 Its strategies included acts of sabotage acts against 
phosphate infrastructures, attacks on border posts, and fomenting mutinies among 
colonial troops.47  
There were other small local groups that clamoured for the end of Spanish rule, 
but they did not always share the project of a Saharawi nation-state. At the 
beginning of the 1970s, the Mouvement Révolutionnaire des Hommes Bleus 
(MOREHOB), funded in Rabat by Eduard Moha, and the Mouvement du 21 Août 
with based in southern Morocco advocated for the integration into this country. 
MOREHOB, however, did support the independence of the territory from 1973 to 
1975, during its exile in Algeria.48 In 1974, the Front de Libération et de l’Unité (FLU), 
carried out several armed attacks also in the name of the integration of Spanish 
Saharan within Morocco. By the end of that year, the Partido de la Unión Nacional 
Saharaui (PUNS) was created by a group of chiuj that proposed independence, but 
with strong relations with Spain.49  
The national territory for which POLISARIO fought was that of the Spanish 
colony. Ironically, the origin of POLISARIO was, in large part, in the neighbouring 
countries, especially Mauritania and Morocco, not only among those exiled after 
the repression of 1970, but also among some of the inhabitants who spoke the same 
Hassaniya Arabic dialectic as the Saharans. The relevance of the colonial borders as 
they existed in the early 1970s is expressed straightforwardly in the fact that 
POLISARIO never produced an official map of their own. Right up to the present 
day, the map that has been exhibited and vindicated by the Saharawi nationalist 
movement, and by its diplomatic delegations worldwide, is a colonial one, a map 
produced by the Geographical Service of the Spanish Army in 1961 showing the 
region's topography, roads and political boundaries.50 The use of a colonial map 
clearly indicates, not only the inevitable lack of cartographic capacity of a 
movement in exile, but its intention to trace a clear genealogy for the project of a 
Western Saharan state from the late Spanish colonial legacy rather than any other 
political entity. 
 
 
                                                
46 Villar, El Proceso, 70. Hodges, Western Sahara. 
47 UN Visiting Mission, paragraph 261. 
48 R. Rézette, Le Sahara Occidentale et les frontières marocaines, Paris, 1975. 
49 UN Visiting Mission to Spanish Sahara. General Assembly, 30th Session, Supplement 23, UN 
DocumentA/10023/Rev., 1975, paragraph 223. 
50 This is the map of the provinces of Ifni, Sahara and Canary Island, elaborated by the 
Geographical Service of the Spanish Army in 1961 (and provided as an online supplement to this 
paper). We are grateful to Bahia Awah for this information. 
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It is worth mentioning, however, that Saharawi nationalists had imagined an 
alternative territory, whose northern border was at the Draa River and not the 27º 
40" parallel to the south. This envisaged a nation-state that incorporated the old 
southern protectorate of Morocco, as Spanish Western Africa had from 1946 to 
1958 (see Fig. 4), on the basis that most of the population living there belonged to 
the same Saharawi kabilas, spoke Hassaniya Arabic and shared many cultural 
forms.51 One of the foundations of this alternative cartography was the nineteenth 
century manuscript Kitab Al-Badiati by Chej Mohamed el Maami, which defined an 
area called Al Badia the "herding country" that covered the part of the Atlantic  
Sahara inhabited by nomadic people. It also mentioned the existence of a "line of 
danger", o Jat Al-Jaof, that separated Al Badia that separated Al Badia from the rest 
of polities of the region, such as Bilad Chingetti, vindicated by the Mauritanian 
authorities.52  
In 1975 this manuscript formed part of the arguments in favour of the 
independence of Spanish Sahara presented at the debates in the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) (see below). As Fig. 7 shows, the Jat Al-Jaof border was hand-
drawn on a National Geographic Magazine map of northwestern Africa and made 
up part of the dossier put together by the Spanish delegation and its Saharan 
advisers for the ICJ, when Spain had already decided to withdraw from the 
territory.53 The commission established for the occasion, formed by Spanish and 
Saharawi experts, felt the need to use these historical arguments in order to offset 
the Moroccan and Mauritanian historical and geographical narratives. 
 
                                                
51 There used to be a map at the National Museum in the Refugee Camp of 27th February, in 
Tindouf, Algeria, where the region south of the Draa River (Cabo Juby, TanTan and Tarfaya), 
which made up the Spanish Southern Protectorate in Morocco, was represented as part of 
Western Sahara. We are indebted to Francesco Correale, who visited the museum in 2007, for this 
information. 
52 ICJ, Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents. Western Sahara, Volume V, 136, 349; Se descifra un 
documento sobre la frontera entre el Sáhara y Mauritania, ABC, 2 July 1975.  
53 Comisión Hispano-Saharaui de Estudios Históricos y Culturales, El Sáhara como unidad cultural 
autóctona, Madrid, 1975. This leaflet collected the main arguments of the Spanish delegation at the 
IJC. 
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Fig. 8: Jat Al-Jaof border 
 From Comisión Hispano-Saharaui de Estudios Históricos y Culturales, El Sáhara como Unidad 
Cultural Autóctona, Madrid, 1975, p.14. 
 
However, because the region this map depicted exceeded the colonial borders of 
Spanish Sahara, the Saharawi movement could never use this alternative political 
map, or make explicit demands regarding lands now under Moroccan, Algerian, 
Malian or Mauritanian sovereignty. The need for international support made 
POLISARIO keen to conform to UN rules on decolonization and to avoid 
articulating any irredentist aspirations. This was one aspect of the importance of 
international organizations for the definition of the Saharawi national territory to 
which we now turn. 
 
THE SELF-DETERMINATION OF THE PEOPLE OF WESTERN SAHARA AT 
THE UNITED NATIONS 
As indicated in previous sections, from the mid-1960s the Committee on 
Decolonization at the United Nations became the forum where the Moroccan, 
Mauritanian, Spanish and Saharawi national projects were confronted with each 
other. In the process, all of them would be transformed and even reduced in their 
territorial aspirations. This was a consequence of the need for all of them to use the 
language of self-determination, and also of the strategic alliances that were formed 
amongst themselves.  
The argument that the Sahara, along with Equatorial Guinea and Ifni, were part of 
the Spanish nation did not convince the Afro-Asiatic countries that dominated the 
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decolonization politics of the United Nations. Moreover, with the agreement to 
transmit information on their African territories to the UN Committee of Twenty-
four in 1960, the same Spanish delegation implicitly accepted their colonial 
character. This was the beginning of a long internal conflict inside the Spanish 
government between, on the one hand, those in charge of the colonial 
administration and promoters of the provincialization strategy at the Ministry of 
the Presidency and, on the other hand, officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
who assumed a more favourable attitude towards decolonization.54 One moment of 
tension arose in 1966, when the Presidency sent some Saharan notables to the 
Committee of Twenty-Four in order to support Spanish policies in the Sahara, 
against the position of the official Spanish delegation itself.55 
The General Assembly's resolutions on Spanish Sahara, approved from 1966 to 
1973 (excluding 1971) by the General Assembly, asked the “administering power” 
to prepare a referendum in order to enable “the indigenous population of the 
Territory to exercise freely its right to self-determination”. It was because of the 
competing claims over the territory, and the proposals for association with other 
states, that it was organization judged necessary, according to UN resolution 
1514(XV) to ask the population and not to assume, as in majority of cases, that 
independence was the only and possible outcome.56 Finally, at the end of 1973 the 
Spanish government invited a UN mission to visit the Sahara. As had happened in 
the case of the Spanish Guinea a decade before, growing international pressures, 
along with the weakness of Franco's regime at the time, pushed the Spanish 
delegation to acquiesce more and more to the UN's demands.  
For their part, the governments in Rabat and Nouakchott increasingly coordinated 
their strategies against Spanish colonialism at the UN. This was done through 
diverse agreements, such as those signed in Casablanca in June 1970 and more 
importantly, the secret agreements signed in Rabat in June 1972 and Fes in August 
1974.57 One of these joint strategies was to look for some legal foundation to their 
claims. At their request, the General Assembly resolution of 1974 on Spanish 
Sahara, in addition to insisting on a visiting mission to the territory, also included 
submitting two questions to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the pre-
colonial political and legal situation of the Spanish Sahara.58  
On 15th October 1975, the final report of the visiting mission that had toured the 
territory and neighbouring countries in May 1975 concluded that there existed 
among the population an ample desire in favour of independence, as well as a 
                                                
54 A. Campos, "The Decolonization of Equatorial Guinea: The relevance of the international factor", 
Journal of African History, 44 (01) (2002) 95-116. 
55 J. de Piniés, La descolonización del Sáhara. Un tema sin concluir, Barcelona, 1990, 16. 
56 UNGA Resolution 2229(XXI). 
57 Ould Daddah, La Mauritanie, 451-480. 
58 These two questions were: “Was Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) at the time of 
colonization by Spain a territory belonging to no one (terra nullius)?” and “If the answer to the 
first question is in the negative, what were the legal ties between this territory and the Kingdom 
of Morocco and the Mauritanian entity?" UNGA Resolution 3292 (XXIX). 
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general rejection of its integration into Morocco. It also recorded the popular 
support for POLISARIO and, to a lesser extent, for PUNS. The same report 
admitted that its presence had functioned as a catalyst for the massive 
demonstrations and protests, which had not previously been possible on such a 
scale and in such comparative safety. The report insisted that a referendum be 
conducted. 59 
Meanwhile, during the hearings at the ICJ in The Hague, the Moroccan, 
Mauritanian and Saharawi interpretations set out above were extensively 
expounded, while Spanish officials, having decided at this point to withdraw from 
the territory, defended the idea of its independence. In its advisory opinion of 16th 
October, one day after to the visiting mission report, the ICJ recognized “the 
existence, at the time of Spanish colonization, of legal ties of allegiance between the 
Sultan of Morocco and some of the tribes living in the territory of Western Sahara”. 
It also admitted “the existence of rights, including some rights relating to the land, 
which constituted legal ties between the Mauritanian entity” and the same 
territory. 60  
The court partially recognized, therefore, both Moroccan and Mauritanian 
historical interpretations, and, as a consequence, highlighted “the overlapping 
character of the respective legal ties” with Western Sahara, as sovereignty in the 
area seemed to have been shared by different polities. What the court did not infer 
was that pre-colonial history affected the right to self-determination of "the peoples 
of the Territory", which it argued should be exercised "through the free and 
genuine expression" of their will.61 It was, therefore, the colonial territory itself, 
and not its history, which determined the "people" for whom the right of self-
determination was recognized.62 Yet this could only be done through the decision 
of the "Saharawi people" in a referendum. It is notable, of course, that no other 
outcome than some sort of statehood was considered for the postcolonial future of 
the Sahara.63 
As the disputes and struggles over the territory continued, the UN developed a 
map of Western Sahara which demarcated the territory that defined the people to 
whom the self-determination principle should apply. Fig. 8 from 1988, is the oldest 
one elaborated by United Nations that can be found in the Dag Hammarskjöld 
                                                
59 UN Visiting Mission to Spanish Sahara. 
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Library in New York. Its borders coincide with those on colonial maps of Spanish 
Sahara since 1958.64  
 
 
Fig. 7: Western Sahara, 1988 
From Dag Hammarskjöld Library, United Nations, New York. 
 
Ultimately, when the map of the Saharawi nation was finally imagined it was 
brought into being not only in opposition to the colonial order, but also within the 
context of competing national imaginations articulated by the Moroccan, the 
Mauritanian and even the Spanish governments. This latecomer would and 
powerful advocates in international organizations such as the United Nations, but 
this support would define, at the same time, the contours of the Saharawi nation 
itself. Conforming to the expectations of the international order precluded 
claiming any other borders (Jat Al-Jaof, for example) than the colonial ones, and 
certainly ruled out any postcolonial political solution other than the nation-state. 
 
                                                
64 The most recent UN map of Western Sahara is the one on the deployment of the UN Mission for 
the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) on the territory; it reproduces the same borders, 
as well as the Moroccan military wall that crosses the territory: 
http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/dpko/minurso.pdf last access July 2016. 
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THE NON-NATIONALIST IMAGINATION 
While the nation-state solution seemed self-evident for the majority of actors in this 
drama it is worth remembering that during these years there appeared some 
propositions appeared that dared to imagine other possibilities. They came, as we 
will see, from very different spaces and actors, such as local activists, the Spanish 
government, a Mauritanian diplomat and intellectual and a French jurist. 
As shown above, the OALS, which operated clandestinely between 1968 and 1970, 
demanded the democratization of the colonial structures, including the abolition of 
the chiuj and the Yemáa, and a greater autonomy for the territory in association 
with Spain prior to independence. For their part, the Yemáa sent a missive to the 
Spanish dictator on the 20th February 1973 in which they simultaneously rejected 
any interference by "foreign parties" and praised the "secular coexistence between 
the Spanish and the Saharan peoples". They called for greater autonomy and 
"participation in the administration of the territory" as a way of exercising the right 
of self-determination.65  
These demands prompted a last attempt to reform of the Spanish political order in 
the Sahara. In July 1974, shortly before the announcement of the referendum by the 
Spanish government, its Ministry of the Presidency proposed a last political regime 
based on an statute of autonomy. This was reminiscent of the British endeavours 
with self-government and the measures adopted in Spanish Guinea a decade 
earlier. The Yemáa, or Sahara General Assembly, would now be elected by general 
suffrage of autochthones and would function as a local legislative council. A 
governing council would be created as the executive branch of the Yemáa, but 
always under the direction of the governor general. In turn, the Spanish 
government would remain in charge of diplomacy, defence and internal security. 
The statute was also accompanied by a five-year investment and development 
programme similar to those approved during the1940s by the French and British 
authorities in their colonies.66  
Among the aspects that make this proposal a non-nationalist solution there is the 
treatment of the question of citizenship and nationality. According to an initiative 
by the Yemáa, ratified by the Spanish governor on November 1974, the previous 
"natives" would be transformed into "autochthones", under the name of 
"Saharawi", though at the same time they were accorded the rights "inherent to the 
Spanish nationality".67 Interestingly, the Spanish state granted the exclusive 
property of the natural resources to the Saharawi people, the benefits from which 
should be reinvested in the territory.68 This was neither a "colonial" nor a "national" 
solution, as autochthones lost the character of subjects and acquired the rights of 
citizens; whereas at the same time, the state recognized a differentiated citizenship. 
                                                
65 Letter of the General Assembly of the Sahara to the Spanish Head of State, 20 February 1973, 
French Diplomatic Archives, 187QO/451 Also cited in UN Document A/10023/Rev. 
66 Programa para la Promoción del Sáhara, 1974-1978; Barona, Hijos de la nube. 
67 Barona, Hijos de la nube, 48. 
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Even a traditional mark of sovereignty, such as the state property of subsoil 
resources, was questioned in this solution. 
In any case, this new attempt at democratizing the old colonial order was in 
contradiction with the authoritarian and centralist character of the Francoist 
regime, and it arrived too late in the decolonization process to be viable. In fact, it 
was never implemented. The local, metropolitan, and international context pushed 
in other directions. By the end of 1974, the Spanish government finally accepted, as 
we have seen, the UN visiting mission, and on 23rd May 1975 it agreed to withdraw 
from the territory.  
There were, however, some other proposals for the end of the colonial situation in 
the Sahara that went further than also the national imagination. One was debated 
in Mauritania, and was best formulated by the diplomat and intellectual Ahmed 
Baba Miske, who in an article published in Le Monde in September 1974 proposed a 
"Maghrebian solution". The idea was to establish a tripartite administration of the 
territory by Mauritania, Morocco and Algeria, which could become quadripartite 
with the participation of representatives of the area's population. This solution was 
envisaged as the best way to ensure the self-determination of the local people, and 
also as a first attempt to create an "experience maghrebine supranationale".69 
Also in 1974, the French lawyer and Morocco specialist Robert Rézette, who had 
written a book on Moroccan political parties in 1955, proposed an alternative 
which displayed a remarkable political and legal imagination. Establishing an 
analogy between the desert and the ocean, he suggested creating an International 
Law of the Desert, similar to that for the sea. For Rézette, the major part of the 
Sahara Desert should be considered as a space open to the freedom of passage of 
the nomadic population, only limited by certain policing and courtesy rules. In 
addition, each of the littoral countries would exercise some sovereignty over its 
fringe of the desert, such as all the coastal countries exercise over their territorial 
seas. Rules would be in place to enable the " common exploitation of the Saharan 
resources by all adjacent countries".70  
This was a marginal proposal, by a negligible actor in this drama, which did not 
take into account the processes of sedentarisation and urbanization of the people of 
the desert during the 1960s. However, along with the other proposals outlined, it is 
proof that the hegemony of the nationalist imagination was questioned during the 
debates and conflicts provoked by the end of European colonial rule in the Atlantic 
Sahara. Despite this, however, it was the idea of the nation-state that triumphed 
within the battle of political imagineries, as it was an idea shared by those who 
ended up dominating the territory, as well as those who fought against them.  
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THE TRIUMPH OF NATIONALISM, THE FAILURE OF CITIZENSHIP AND 
THE BEGINNING OF A NEW WAR 
At the end of 1975, the conflicts among governments and a political movement and 
their competing national projects increased in intensity, eventually creating a 
reconfiguration of power and numerous displacements of people across the 
territory. Unlike the majority of cases in Africa, the outcome was not the 
emergence of a new state where there had been a colony, but to the contested 
integration of the territory into neighbouring state and the creation of a new 
political space, a refugee camp on the Algerian side of the border, governed by a 
movement of national liberation. 
After the Moroccan mobilization of a military force against the Spanish colony, 
accompanied by hundreds of thousands of people in what was called the Green 
March, a tripartite agreement was signed in Madrid on 14th November 1975, and 
Morocco and Mauritania replaced the Spanish in controlling the territory.71 After 
that, half of the local population fled to Algeria and settled in refugee camps near 
the border town of Tindouf, from where POLISARIO established a socialist regime 
and organized its war against Morocco.72 On 27th February 1976, the POLISARIO 
government proclaimed the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (RASD), would 
be recognized by thirty-two states, of which nineteen were African, before the end 
of the decade..73 
In 1979, the Mauritanian government formally recognized POLISARIO’s claims to 
the territory and renounced its national project for Western Sahara. At the same 
time, Morocco incorporated the Mauritanian portion of the former colony to its 
national territory, making the whole of Spanish Sahara part of the Southern Region 
out of the seven areas created in 1971 through which the state territory was 
administratively organized. In successive territorial reforms of the state, in 1997 
and 2015, Western Sahara would be subdivided into three different regions with 
no reference to past colonial borders (whether the Draa river or the 27º 40" 
parallel).74 The official map of the Kingdom of Morocco has subsequently shown a 
national territory comprised of the former protectorate in Morocco and the rest of 
Spanish possessions in the region (see Fig. 9).  
 
                                                
71 See the supplementary map on Moroccan and Mauritanian partition and incorporation of 
Spanish Sahara, 1975-1979, prepared by the authors. 
72 P. San Martín, Western Sahara: The Refugee Nation, Cardiff, 2010, 105, 109. 
73 C. Ruiz Miguel, Una documentación esencial para conocer el Sáhara Occidental: 
http://asoc.umdraiga.com/documentos/RASD/RECONOCIMIENTOS_DE_LA_RASD.htm last 
accessed 19 July 2016. 
74 A. Suárez Collado and R. Ojeda García, "The effects of the Moroccan advanced regionalization 
process in Western Sahara", Transmodernity: Journal of Peripheral Cultural Production of the Luso-
Hispanic World, 5(3) (2015). 
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Fig 9: The Kingdom of Morocco  
From the webside of the Moroccan Embassy in India,  
http://ambamaroc-india.gov.ma/  last consulted, 16th January 2016) 
 
As a result of Morocco's incorporation of the territory thousands of colonists 
arrived from the north, many of them from the adjoining region where people 
shared many linguistic and cultural features with those of former Spanish Sahara. 
However, it is debatable whether this integration was a "national" project or 
whether it should be described as "colonial’. In relation to the economy if certainly 
responded to an extractive logic as it was almost exclusively based on phosphate 
mining and fisheries. 75 Moreover, the territory's government is more concerned 
with policing character than in the rest of the country, and the violation of human 
rights constitutes a persistent instrument of political control.76 
During the war between the Moroccan army and POLISARIO, although competing 
territorial imaginations persisted, they diverged dramatically from the situation on 
the ground. In the 1980s Rabat raised its two thousand kilometres of sand walls 
within the borders of its claimed territory as a barrier against POLISARIO.77 So, 
                                                
75 V. Trasosmontes, "La explotación de los recursos naturales en el Sahara Occidental", in: I. 
Barreñada and R. Ojeda García (Eds.), Sáhara Occidental. 40 años después, Madrid, 2016.  
76 Euro-Mediterranean Human Rights Network, Mission Report, The Human Rights Situation in 
Morocco and the Western Sahara, March 2015: http://euromedrights.org/publication/human-
rights-situation-in-morocco-and-the-western-sahara/ last access August 2016. 
77 The path of the wall coincides largely with the spread of a giant aquifer that the Spaniards found 
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while Moroccan rulers represented its national territory as including the whole of 
the old Spanish Sahara, in effect its control did not reach east of the wall. For their 
part, the leaders of RASD and the POLISARIO still imagined the Saharawi nation 
in the framework of the old Spanish Sahara. But what they exercised was a kind of 
shared sovereignty over the refugee camps along with the Algerian government, 
and a growing control over the territorial fringe to the east of the Moroccan sand 
wall.78  
In spite of the ceasefire of 1991, the referendum that was part of the peace 
agreement has not yet been undertaking. A strong disagreement arose over who 
should be allowed to vote. The Moroccan government wants to include those 
inhabitants that have settled in the territory since 1975, POLISARIO privileged all 
those autochthones who used to live in Spanish Sahara and their descendants. For 
the Saharawi nationalism, old colonial borders have continued to define the 
territory of the future Saharawi state, but do not define the nation any more. After 
the demographic changes brought about by processes of exile, re-settlement and 
emigration, the Saharawi nation is now imagined as a transnational community 
spread across different spaces, from the refugees" camps to the Moroccan-occupied 
territory, and on to the diaspora of emigrants in neighbouring countries in Africa 
and also in Europe.79  
These positions have shifted more recently, but they have not come close to 
resolution. POLISARIO have accepted some of the proposals coming from the UN 
Mission for the Referendum for Western Sahara (MINURSO) and the personal 
envoy of the UN secretary-general for the Western Sahara in 2003, but the 
Moroccan government seems to have renounced its commitment to hold the 
referendum.80 As an alternative, Rabat has proposed conceding wider autonomy to 
the territory. However, as was the case with the Spanish statute of autonomy  of 
1974, and given the authoritarian character of the Moroccan regime and the lack of 
consultations with the population limits to the effectiveness of this solution seem 
evident.81 In the meantime, people on both sides of the sand wall continue to suffer 
a marginal citizenship status and the subordination of their human rights to 
incompatible nationalist ventures. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                               
when doing oil exploration in the region.  
78 The map published by the Spanish research and journalism team Colectivo Mediterráneo Sur, 
shows the areas effectively controlled by Moroccan government and POLISARIO Front: 
http://msur.es/focos/sahara, last accessed 19 July 2016. 
79 A. Wilson, "Cycles of crisis, migration and the formation of new political identities in Western 
Sahara", Working Paper du CePeD, 25 (2012) 1-20. 
80 M.G. Guindo and A. Bueno, "La cuestión del Sáhara Occidental: de los Acuerdos de Madrid hasta 
hoy (1975-2016)", in: Barreñada and Ojeda, Sáhara Occidental. 
81 J. C. Gimeno, "¿Elegir entre paz y justicia? Apuntes para la resolución del conflicto del Sahara 
Occidental", Revista Andaluza de Antropología, 10 (2016). 
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CONCLUSION 
This article has demonstrated that social actors can conceptualize a territory and its 
borders in very different forms, and construct through in this way a framework for 
their struggles. If it is true, in the majority of cases, that nationalistic claims do not 
form a united argument, then they have particularly plural and conflictingin the 
Sahara. Moroccan and Mauritanian irredentism imagined two bigger nations based 
on different interpretations of old old histories of political connections across the 
desert. For their part, the Spanish and Saharawi nationalists emphasized mainly 
European imperial history and colonial borders in order to lay a foundation for 
their claims. The "nations" that these imaginings referred to were at odds with each 
other, as they were defined by different borders, and were considered to be 
products of alternative versions of history.  
The United Nations, and particularly the Afro-Asiatic bloc of countries that 
dominated its decolonization politics, assumed an important role in this process. It 
did not only provided one of the main forums for these struggles, but also shaped 
the language in with which the contenders had to express their aspirations. If the 
final conclusions of the UN visiting mission to the territory and the International 
Court of Justice's advisory opinion seemed to support POLISARIO's project it was 
in large part because POLISARIO adapted themselves and their imagination of the 
future, including the borders of the territory claimed, to the language of self-
determination and the uti possidetis principle.  
Indeed, since the end of the 1970s both the Moroccan and Saharawi nationalists 
have persisted in their claims to the whole territory on the basis of conflicting 
nationalist narratives. Ironically, this has happened in an area traditionally criss-
crossed by numerous groups that have tended to identify borders as porous and 
non-defining of political orders. Sovereignty has historically been shared, 
fragmented, and superseded in the Atlantic Sahara context. The alternative and 
heterodox non-nationalist proposals raised during the frustrated decolonization 
process prove that the multiple histories of the Saharan desert may inspire more 
complex political imaginations, in order to ensure the citizenship rights and 
mutual understanding of its current inhabitants.  
This article maintains that it is worth remembering all the possibilities that were 
opened up during the late Spanish colonial period, as well as those that were 
closed, in order to better understand the later conflict between Moroccan and 
Saharawi nationalisms. We also suggests that the difficulties of arriving at a 
negotiated and final solution are due not only to Moroccan dilatory tactics, but also 
to the exclusionary nature of territorial nationalism, which hinders the possibilities 
of foreseeing any solution different from a sovereign state. The recovery of older 
debates may help to conceive other possibilities not yet imagined, which might 
permit all the inhabitants of the area to peacefully enjoy the land. 
This is not to argue for yet another solution based on the past that does not take 
into account the will of the people that currently live in (or want to come back to) 
the territory. A more complex interpretation of history can be inspirational, but it 
can hardly provide the basis of any durable political solution that the people 
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concerned have not agreed. In this sense, the organization of a referendum in 
Western Sahara is probably a crucial condition for the solution of the current 
conflict. We would simply ask whether the alternatives proposed in that halted 
referendum should be limited to those regarding competing nation-states, or if 
they should incorporate some other non-nationalist proposals, including the 
sharing of sovereignty over the same space, that would enable the enjoyment of 
freedom of movement and citizen rights for all its inhabitants.   
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